Introduction
This paper presents a logical formalism for fundamental concepts of traditional grammar.
In its basic sense a grammar is simply a system of (informal) rules which try to discriminate correct linguistic expressions from ones that are incorrect, according to an ideal speaker of the language considered. The term traditional grammar refers to the concepts, methods, and terminology, elaborated over the centuries by grammarians, philosophers and linguists, that constitute (more and less consciously) the average linguistic culture: proposition, predicate, substantive, subject, attribute, complement, modi er, determiner, coordination, subordination, anaphora, ellipsis, deixis, and sentence. These concepts are generally used on the basis of their informal linguistic evidence and often with criteria that depend on the particular language they refer to. Nevertheless, their theoretical relevance is based on very deep roots in Western philosophy from Plato, Aristotle and Dionysus Trax, to the Speculative Grammar of Scholastic philosophy, to the`Grammar' and`Logic' of Port Royal (17th century), where the terminological and conceptual apparatus of traditional Indo-European grammars were elaborated 18] .
We claim that a deep logical analysis of traditional grammar can indicate a linguistic level, or metagrammatical level, where the basic meaning of simple conversational language could be formally analyzed and logically represented (see 12, 13] for earlier versions of the formalism here considered).
The idea of a logical formulation of classical linguistic analysis was already present in the rst investigations of modern mathematical logic. Here 17] . Nevertheless, Reichenbach's proposal is simply a collection of interesting examples covering important phenomena of natural language expressiveness, rather than a de nition of a rigorous formalism. Several developments emerged from the late 1950s to the early 1970s: Lambek's version of earlier categorial grammar 9], generative semantics which extended Chomsky's paradigm 3, 11], Montague's approach to natural language in terms of model theoretic concepts and high order logics. These approaches (proof theoretic, generative and model theoretic) strongly in uenced later research on the formal analysis of natural language, and the related elds of knowledge representations and non classical logics (see for example 8, 1]).
One feature, common to many logical approaches to natural language, is their complexity and speci city. One of the main objectives of this paper, on the other hand, is to develop a wide range logical formalism: Metagramma. This formalism is comparable with rst order logic in the formal description of mathematical theories, or with programming languages in the speci cation of algorithms. Metagramma consists of symbolic rules with which we can construct formulae built by lexemes of a speci c lexicon and symbols expressing logicogrammatical functionalities. The denotative content of simple, but non trivial texts can thus be adequately expressed by a set of metagrammatical formulae.
Notations for metagrammatical concepts
In every natural language there are expressions that have the following four fundamental syntactic types: i) sentence (assertive, imperative, interrogative), ii) proposition iii) predicate, iv) substantive.
As a rst approximation, we can assume that substantives can represent individuals (of some -maybe high order -universe). Predicates represent properties over individuals. Propositions represent statements, and sentences represent assertions, questions or commands.
Let us call categorema any expression that has some fundamental syntactic type. The following are general postulates describing basic aspects common to almost all natural languages. The syntactic constructions underlying the above postulates are: determination, predication, deixis, assertion, complementation, modification, anaphora, coordination, substantivation, and pluralization. We do not claim that this list includes all the constructions of natural languages, but only that most texts of any natural language can be represented, in their internal logical structure, by suitable combinations of these syntactical operations.
In Metagramma we adopt three kinds of metagrammatical determination. The rst one, symbolized by Peano-Russell's descriptive iota operator expresses de nite determination, i.e. given a predicate Pred, it yields the uniquely determined object (Pred) which satis es the property represented by Pred. The second one symbolized by Hilbert-Bernays' epsilon operator expresses the particular determination, i.e. given a predicate Pred, it yields a particular element (Pred) which satis es the property represented by Pred. The third one is the inde nite determination operator such that, given a predicate Pred, (Pred) represents any element which satis es the property represented by Pred. In Metagramma the predication construct is expressed by equations, therefore, an expression such as`a Pred' should be seen as an abbreviation for`a = Pred'.
The symbol denotes the speech situation, that is the Hic-et-nunc or Hereand-now state of the a airs with respect to which any extralinguistic element (for spatio-temporal-personal deixis) has to be related. A similar symbol was already used in an analogous way (for`autore exive tokens') by Reichenbach 17] . The symbols a; b; : : :, are individual constants, and`is the assertion symbol, already used by Russell, which connects situations and propositions thus producing declarative assertions. Commands or questions are indicated by adding ! or ? to`respectively (Possibly adding to ? a pronoun).
Anaphoric constants or pronouns A; B; : : : play a di erent role from individual constants. Namely, in natural language, we can speak of things that do not exist, i.e. we have to distinguish between descriptive entities and existential entities. When, w.r.t. a situation s, we assert`a Pred' we assume that something exists in the situation s which veri es the property Pred and we introduce the name a for such an entity. Conversely, given a de nite or particular description, if we want to refer to the substantive that it identi es, without any existential commitment, then, we put an anaphora such as A := Description. For this reason we introduce a more precise distinction: we call term any descriptive expression obtained by , , operators, and only when an individual has been equated to a term can it be considered an existential term, i.e. a substantive in a proper sense.
In natural languages, modi cation and complementation are usually realized by attributive phrases, adverbs, or by complementative particles. A metagrammatical representation of an expression such as`big man' is`bighmani', where angle parentheses indicate modi cation. Complementation is expressed by`dot su xing'; for example,`eat:b' indicates that parameter b is added to the predicate eat as a direct complement, in order to complete its meaning. Indirect complementation is obtained by combining modi cation and dot-complementation; for example`eat with the fork' is translated by the metagrammatical formula eat:(instrumenth forki), where in this case, the modi cation applies to a term and produces a modi ed term, and the modi er expresses the role of the term in the indirect complementation.
In the following, we assume a set of atomic predicates represented by lexemes of a natural language (e.g. English nouns, verbs and adjectives), which will be speci ed implicitly when they occur.
Let us consider some short examples. A metagrammatical representation is a sequence of elementary formulae, each of which is a sentence or an anaphora. . Nevertheless, its reformulation in the framework of Metagramma, where a clear distinction between events and situations is adopted, allows us to avoid some aspects of non uniformity and adhocness in Reichenbach's formalism. In a statement such as`John believes that Paul is here', if`Paul is here' is represented by a proposition P, then the global sentence has a metagrammatical representation of the following type: `j believe: P]. In logical languages, anaphora and quanti cation are realized by means of formal variables and variable-binding constructs, i.e. 8 quanti cation and Church's lambda abstraction. Reichenbach adopts the same tools in his formalism. In the following examples we show that anaphora and determination can express the universal quanti cation and relative clauses of natural language in a manner that is very close to the linguistic forms present in almost all languages. Equations a = Pred, a = Pred, and a = Pred represent di erent kinds of existential denotation, corresponding respectively to`a is the Pred',`a is a Pred' and`a is some Pred' (an existent, but inde nite substantive). Analogously, anaphoric assignments A := Pred, A := Pred, allow us to consider A as its corresponding description, without any existential commitment. However, an A metagrammatical representation over a lexicon L is a sequence of formulae such that for each of them, the type Sent or Ref can be assigned according to the rules of the next subsection.
Metagrammatical Typing System
In the following, N is the set of natural numbers. Letters ; ; are syntactic variables ranging on the expressions constructed by: the 16 logical symbols, a set I of symbols for individuals, a set P of symbols for pronouns, a set S of symbols for situations, and a set L of lexemes. Symbol Type is a syntactic variable ranging on types. Given an expression , then` ' stands for its quotation (a name for its linguistic form). The following rules apply to (metagrammatical) typing sequences: if the premises occur in a typing sequence, then the conclusion can be added as its last element. The expression Free( ) is a condition that holds if no anaphoric reference, such as := : Ref, occurs in the typing sequence. The symbol r indicates any determination operator belonging to f ; ; g, and 6 = means that and are two di erent symbols. Furthermore,`( : Type; : : :) : Stat' means that in the considered typing sequence the assignment : Stat has been derived by using at some previous step the assumptions : Type; : : :. The boxed formulae are the metagrammatical representation of Example 5.
Conclusions
An interesting feature of Metagramma is its easy usage in the representation of texts where commonly used logical formalisms are completely inadequate for the complexity of generated formulae. We tested Metagramma in several applications: i) instructions for the use of a heater, or for assembling the parts of a personal computer; ii) children's stories such as Cinderella; iii) statements and proofs of theorems of elementary geometry; iv) Latin texts of considerable syntactical complexity (a Letter by Cicero). Usually the length of the metagrammatical representation (number of lines) is no more than twice the number of lines in the original texts. However, almost all the formalizations considered retain the global intelligibility of the associated texts. More thorough testing with Metagramma should help to highlight its weaknesses and pave the way for improvements and possible extensions. Another open issue is the formal aspect of Metagramma; for example, its relationship with logical systems dealing formally with situations and intensions 1, 2, 5, 15]. A more proof theory oriented analysis could individuate inference rules for deriving assertions from other assertions. Such rules would add a new level to the formal description of metagrammalical notions. We only give two fragments of derivations in the formal generation of metagrammatical paraphrases. For example, consider the metagrammatical representations of`a is walking fast to b'. The following is a simple derivation, obtained by using suitable rules, of a metagrammatical paraphrase that in English corresponds tò if a is walking fast to b then a's walking to b is fast'.
`a (fasthwalki):(destinationhbi) `( walk:(destinationhbi))]:a fast analogously, the next is a (trivial) derivation for:`if a is walking fast to b then a is walking':
`a (fasthwalki):(destinationhbi) `a (fasthwalki) Another important aspect of metagrammatical representations is the lexicon on which these representations are constructed. In order to get a true interlingual character, a metagrammatical formula has to contain lexemes without any semantic ambiguity. This aspect entails a thorough analysis of archetypal lexicons, their nature and their structure. A subject for future work would be to nd some possible connection between Thom's 16 archetypal logoi determined by topological analyses and logical approaches to natural language 19, 6, 14] . If lexicons used in metagrammatical representations are well chosen, then a person who knows Metagramma, and who consults a suitable bilingual dictionary should be able to produce a corresponding metagrammaticalrepresentation based on the lexicon of a language that he/she does not know, in order to communicate with a speaker of that language (who knows Metagramma). In this sense, metagrammatical representations can be seen as a sort of formal counterpart of the linguistic projects on arti cial languages 10], intimately connected to knowledge representation, semi-automatic translation, linguistic typology, and to the old and fascinating theme of universal grammar 7, 4] .
